In Barnard’s view, a fit and healthy Botha — firmly in charge of his security forces — would have been a much tougher nut for the ANC to crack than FW turned out to be. He argues that Botha should be remembered not simply through a military prism as the instigator of the total onslaught/total strategy policy, but rather as someone who used the SADF as a shield behind which "the necessary political steps could be taken in relative peace".
It is unlikely that posterity will treat the mercurial and irascible Groot Krokodil as kindly as Barnard does here, and it must be doubtful whether Botha and Mandela could ever have made common cause over the gulf that divided them. But who can be certain? What might have happened had Botha not suffered his severe stroke in 1989 (and been succeeded by De Klerk) will remain among the great "what ifs" of South African history.