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Post by Trog on May 16, 2014 8:38:19 GMT
Would the subsequent retention/restoration of such control not be racist and does the land claim legislation envisage such (racist) restoration? I suppose it depends on what the land claim legislation actually is. I have no idea of who it describes as entitled to claim land, how they are described, what proof they need to submit in order to support a claim, etc. Also relevant and interesting would be the language used in the legislation. Any mention of indigenous people, previously disadvantaged, forcibly removed, that kind of thing? Maybe the whole thing can eventually be challenged in the constitutional court?
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Post by cjm on May 16, 2014 17:19:12 GMT
Would the subsequent retention/restoration of such control not be racist and does the land claim legislation envisage such (racist) restoration? I suppose it depends on what the land claim legislation actually is. I have no idea of who it describes as entitled to claim land, how they are described, what proof they need to submit in order to support a claim, etc. Also relevant and interesting would be the language used in the legislation. Any mention of indigenous people, previously disadvantaged, forcibly removed, that kind of thing? Maybe the whole thing can eventually be challenged in the constitutional court? The terminology in the legislation concerned is pretty neutral and sweeping but the reference to 1913 makes it rather obvious that claims by the white group are not contemplated as a primary aim. However, I don´t think a claim by a white group is excluded - provided all requirements are met. My comments about racism are made in the context of the constitution - in terms of which the legislation concerned was issued. It seems to me rather unlikely that the constitution would countenance a power structure dominated exclusively by one race group. Hence, following from this view: Claims can only be recognised with reference to ownership, occupation and use of the land - the power to grant exclusive political control to one race over such land is not bestowed. The political control over the entire surface of the Republic (regardless of the race living in any particular area) can only be exercised in terms of the constitution - which involves a universal franchise. Perhaps the powers exercised in terms of tribal practice, over communal land, present a way out of this conclusion, but I suspect that the counter argument would be that such exclusive black powers are authorised and bestowed in terms of the constitution. Here is the core of the legislation concerned: RESTITUTION OF LAND RIGHTS ACT 22 OF 1994... 2. Entitlement to restitution(1) A person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if - (a) he or she is a person dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices ; or (b) ... (c)... (d) it is a community or part of a community dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; and (e) the claim for such restitution is lodged not later than 31 December 1998. ... From the definition section:“racially discriminatory laws”include laws made by any sphere of government and subordinate legislation; [Definition of “racially discriminatory laws” inserted by s. 2 of Act 63/97] “racially discriminatory practices”means racially discriminatory practices, acts or omissions, direct or indirect, by - (a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; (b) any other functionary or institution which exercised a public power or performed a public function in terms of any legislation; [Definition of “racially discriminatory practices” inserted by s. 2 of Act 63/97] “right in land” means any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question; “community” means any group of persons whose rights in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group, and includes part of any such group;
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Post by Trog on May 17, 2014 5:56:56 GMT
But to be dispossessed of a ‘right in land’, you must first posses it, not so?
1. So of all the successful claims granted up to now, did the beneficiaries demonstrate that they possessed a ‘right in land’ to that land?
2. What would the court have deemed to be sufficient evidence of a previous ‘right in land’?
3. Does the ‘Front National’ claim not contain ample evidence of a previous ‘right in land’?
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Post by cjm on May 18, 2014 19:55:09 GMT
But to be dispossessed of a ‘right in land’, you must first posses it, not so? 1. So of all the successful claims granted up to now, did the beneficiaries demonstrate that they possessed a ‘right in land’ to that land? 2. What would the court have deemed to be sufficient evidence of a previous ‘right in land’? 3. Does the ‘Front National’ claim not contain ample evidence of a previous ‘right in land’? As to 1: It is not necessary to demonstrate ownership as such , but in a loose sense entitlement to any one, or more, of the various incidents of ownership is required. Ownership is often described as a bundle of rights. Accordingly (for the purposes of the Act), even the entitlement to one of the many aspects of ownership might suffice. In this way a servitude, right of occupation, mortgage bond or right to inherit the land, could be described as a right in land. I also think that a contractual claim to have land transferred might be seen as a right in land (admittedly, not in the traditional technical legal sense). The requirement is very widely construed for the purposes of the legislation concerned - so I have learned. As to 2: It seems that the test generally is the same as in civil cases - evidence on a balance of probabilities is required. As to 3: I think that the FN right in land essentially amounts to the right to a white vote. Surely the *Dutch* people concerned did not lose any land as a result of discriminatory racial legislation. Such land as they do not own any more, they either sold or gave to black tribes. What they lost in 1994, is the white vote.
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Post by cjm on May 20, 2014 7:06:48 GMT
I suppose that the loss of the white vote really amounts to the loss of sovereignty in respect of the land concerned or the loss of the right of self-determination for whites. After all, a democratic (read, multiracial) exercise of voting rights is not (yet) a requirement of international law. In any event, talking of democratic rights in respect of the land is a mirage for the whites. Twenty years later, voting in SA is still on racial grounds and the only thing that has happened is that whites have become the punch bag and slaves of the black majority.
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Post by cjm on May 23, 2014 19:25:50 GMT
It seems clear that the sovereignty/right to self-determination acquired by the Dutch people as per the content of the FN claim, persisted until 1993, when the interim Constitution and in 1996, the current one, took away that right by creating a common voters' roll for a single territory. 1. Republic of South Africa.- The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values:
...(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll ...The Land Restitution Act has its origin in exactly this same constitution which removed all traces of a white state. Here is an account of its pedigree: ... 3.1 Restitution of rights in land in the interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993
Before the final Constitution was adopted, the constitutional framework for the restitutionprocess was outlined in sections 121, 122 and 123 of the interim Constitution. Section121(1) obliged Parliament to enact legislation to provide for restitution of land rights.
Section 121(2) gave individuals or Communities the right to restitution if they had beendispossessed of rights in land as a result of laws that would have been inconsistent withthe right to equality contained in section 8(2) of the interim Constitution. This meantthat only land dispossessions that took place as a result of racially discriminatory lawswere recognised as valid for the purposes of restitution. Finally, section 121(3)provided that the Act of Parliament envisaged could not fix the cut-off point for restitutionclaims to a time earlier than 19 June 1913, the date on which the Natives Land Act 27of 1913 was passed.
The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 is the legislation envisaged in section121 of the interim Constitution. lt provides the details on how the restitution programmeis to be implemented. The Restitution Act went further than the interim Constitution by,among other things fixing the closing date for the lodging of claims for restitution, at 31December 1998.
... [Lest We Forget: Jurisprudence on Restitution of Land Rights in South Africa (2007) by Maureen Tong. Published by Department Land Affairs,Republic of South Africa, and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, pp31-32. Available as a PDF download ]
So we have the situation that the very legislation (the Constitution) which took away Dutch rights of self determination/sovereignty, gave birth to the Land Restitution Act, which now is invoked by FN to undo that removal of rights. Can this be? I cannot see why not, as the Constitution also maintained the previous injustices (black removals, for example) which the Land Restitution Act is trying to put right - also a contradiction in terms. One can waste a great deal of ink on these apparent conflicts but in essence I would propose that the idea behind the Land Restitution Act is to provide justice in individual cases which the Constitution by the nature of its broader canvass cannot adequately deal with. Looked at in this way, the Land Restitution Act can provide justice in those cases of Dutch sovereignty, which were ignored. The rights of tribal authorities (which are not particularly democratic either) are expressly preserved by the Constitution (see Sections 211-212). White communities are flagrantly disregarded in this respect. What would be fairer than the Land Restitution Act stepping in here to undo this travesty of justice? To be sure, there is a vague, insipid reference in the Constitution, to self determination (and presumably, sovereignty), for whoever asks for it (Section 235), but it is not really on par with black customary rights. A glaring act of discrimination.
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Post by cjm on May 26, 2014 18:23:26 GMT
If it is true that the only thing the Dutch people of the FN claim lost in 1994 was their exclusive vote in respect of the territory concerned, one may ask whether that amounts to a right in land for the purposes of the Restitution Act.
It is clear that the ‘right in land’ has been given a very wide scope by the courts. It does not concern only what a property lawyer would call rights in rem, but also personal rights. One may refer as authority here to the Constitutional court in the Richtersveld case ( Case CCT 19/03):
[88] The concept of dispossession in section 25(7) of the Constitution and in section 2 of the Act is not concerned with the technical question of the transfer of ownership from one entity to another. It is a much broader concept than that, given the wide definition of “a right in land” in the Act. Whether there was dispossession in this case must be determined by adopting a substantive approach, having due regard to the provisions of the Precious Stones Act and the conduct of the government in giving effect to them.
See also Mphela & Others v Engelbrecht & Others LCC 66/01 (1).
A right to vote without a corresponding territory is meaningless. In other words, the right to an effective vote can be considered a right in land, given the wide ambit of the phrase recognized by the courts. The term ‘vote’ is here used as a shorthand term to describe the rights and powers associated with ownership, independence, sovereignty, self-determination, citizenship, territory and statehood (see generally Hosten et al: Introduction to SA Law and Legal theory (1995), Butterworths, pp 1278-1287)
As for the removal of the vote by means of the Constitution, it is so that a vote has been retained by the whites in the country. However, from the point of view of whites (*the Dutch*), such vote is meaningless considering the fact that voting is on racial terms and further bearing in mind the overwhelming black numbers posed against them.
One may note as an aside here that in the territory subject to the claim, it may well be that land has been allocated in response to claims in terms of the very Restitution Act employed here. This raises considerations which are not explored further as I don´t think it affects the overall picture.
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Post by cjm on May 27, 2014 5:03:27 GMT
As illustration of the independence enjoyed by the territories north of the Vaal:
Sandrivierkonvensie, 17 Januarie 1852
...
Eerstens. Hare Majesteit Assistent Commissarissen waarborgen ten volsten aan de zeyde van het Britsche Gouvernement aan de Emigrante Boeren, Noord van den Vaalrivier, het recht om haare eigene affaire te bestieren en haar lieden te regeren volgens haare eigene Wetten, zonder bemoeyenis hoe ook genaamd van het Britsche Gouvernement en dat geen overschreding van het grondgebied ten Noorden van het Vaal revier zal gedaan worden, door gemelde Gouvernement. Met de verdere verzekering dat het (de) vurigste begeerten van den Britsche Gouvernement is om vrede, vryhandel, en vriendelyke verstandhouding met de Emigrante Boeren bewonende of die noch bewonen zal, deze landstreekt voort te zeten, en word verder verstaan dat deze stelzel van geene bemoeijenis is wederzyds.
...
I wonder how many times this agreement was breached by the British.
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Post by cjm on May 31, 2014 17:42:17 GMT
It has been argued earlier that the mere fact that a claim is facilitated by the Restitution Act (which was given birth to by the Constitution), is not a bar to a claim even if the Constitution itself creates the new dispossession (the removal of the exclusive white vote).
However it gets more technical than that because the Restitution Act provides:
2. Entitlement to restitution
(1) A person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if -
(a) he or she is a person dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices ; or
(b)...
(c) ...
and
(e) the claim for such restitution is lodged not later than 31 December 1998.
These provisions are mainly mandated by section 121 (2) of the interim Constitution - which does not appear to make the meaning any clearer.
In particular, from which vantage point is ‘past’ - see bold text - evaluated here? Does it mean that only dispossessions earlier than the Constitution (or interim Constitution) are taken into account? This is in fact the view (obiter, it is submitted) of the Constitutional Court in the Richtersveld case (par 39 of CCT 19/03) Or does it mean that ‘past’ is evaluated with reference to the cut-off date for claims which is 31 December 1998?
The Courts have leaned backwards to accommodate claimants, talking about (1) a robust approach, (2) allowing claims which were technically not lodged in time, (3) riding rough shot over technical issues, (4) regarding customary law rights as rights recognized by the Restitution Act, (5) not requiring physical removal from land, (5) accepting that a single act of dispossession is not required (dispossession can take place by various actions over a period of time), (6) watering down the causality requirement between state action and dispossession (dispossession can be the result of decisions taken by ordinary individuals for their own motives), (7) regarding even a family as a community for the purpose of land claims, (8) finding that members of a community need not have been direct descendants of the original occupants, (9) allowing some members of the community to claim even if others do not, (10) allowing claimants a right of restitution even where compensatory land was received and no forcible dispossession was involved, (11) awarding mineral rights to communities even though such rights vest in the state, (12) allowing even whites to claim.
In this light it would seem contrary, to the trend, to restrict claims to legally significant occurrences prior to the interim Constitution. In the event, the removal of the exclusive white vote was a process started by sanctions, terrorism, the border war, Communist intervention, UN resolutions and the pre-constitutional talks. The final removal of the rights in the legislation concerned was a final empty formality preceded by decades of earlier pressure.
Even if the claim is disallowed on the basis that the cut-off date was the interim Constitution, it should be possible to lodge a similar attack in terms of section 9 - the equality clause - (or even section 25) of the Constitution. The Restitution Act was originally linked in the interim Constitution to section 8 (also an equality clause: the forerunner of the current section 9). A much more difficult task. Apologies, this is lawyer´s mumble but for the sake of completeness, I had to add that.
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Post by cjm on Jun 7, 2014 16:35:52 GMT
racially discriminatory laws or practices
A claim only comes under the ambit of the Restitution Act if dispossession was as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices. Apart from the wide definition section, causality was interpreted widely in Popela Community v Goedegelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd Unreported Case number CCT69/06.
Tong (op cit at p23) says:
Significantly, the Constitutional Court held that the dispossession of land rights does not have to take place ‘as a result of’ action by a state or a public functionary. It is sufficient if the termination of rights in land was “permitted, aided and supported by racially discriminatory laws or practices of the state or other functionaries exercising public power. The question is not whether dispossession is effected by the State or a public functionary, but rather whether the dispossession was as a consequence of laws or practices put in place by the state or other public functionary.”
But was the removal of the right of whites (their dispossession), to exercise exclusive political control over the area concerned, as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices? There is no doubt that exclusive white control was targeted - an action based on race. Can it be discrimination when such rights are subsequently equally distributed between different races? Is this not merely undoing previous discrimination?
The right to a vote is not (yet) an international human right - nor is there an international right to democracy. There is nothing in law which entitles all inhabitants of this land (previously, validly acquired and held by a white group) to share in political control. In any event, considering the fact that whites are a minute minority in this area, distributing political rights equally is effective dispossession for the purposes of the legislation concerned. If such dispossession is not recognized as an international infringement of human rights (yet), it should be.
Is discrimination undone by the fact that the dispossession is ultimately sanctioned and sanitized by the constitution? Discrimination is discrimination wherever it is found. If it happens to be sanctioned by one part of the Constitution, it surely runs against its tenor as a whole and is undone by both the equality clause (S 9) and the property clause (S 25(6) &(7) and also the Restitution Act.
QED
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Post by cjm on Jun 23, 2014 8:08:06 GMT
The validity of the FN claim is also affected by various other bits and pieces scattered in the Restitution Act.
I. Section 2 provides:
(2) No person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if -
(a) just and equitable compensation as contemplated in section 25(3) of the Constitution; or
(b) any other consideration which is just and equitable,
calculated at the time of any dispossession of such right, was received in respect of such dispossession.
It is submitted that no consideration was received in respect of such dispossession. Of course SA was opened up to the world (and vice versa) after the whites were stripped of exclusive political rights in 1994. If however, such isolation was unjustly imposed on the country in respect of the FN claim, the removal is not compensation but a right which should have been respected to start off with.
II. Section 33 tells the court what it has to take into account when considering a claim:
33. Factors to be taken into account by Court
In considering its decision in any particular matter the Court shall have regard to the following factors:
(a) The desirability of providing for restitution of rights in land to any person or community dispossessed as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices;
(b) the desirability of remedying past violations of human rights;
(c) the requirements of equity and justice;
(cA) if restoration of a right in land is claimed, the feasibility of such restoration;
(d) the desirability of avoiding major social disruption;
(e) any provision which already exists, in respect of the land in question in any matter, for that land to be dealt with in a manner which is designed to protect and advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to promote the achievement of equality and redress the results of past racial discrimination;
(eA) the amount of compensation or any other consideration received in respect of the dispossession, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the dispossession;
(eB) the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused, the current use of the land and the history of the acquisition and use of the land;
(eC) in the case of an order for equitable redress in the form of financial compensation, changes over time in the value of money;
(f) any other factor which the Court may consider relevant and consistent with the spirit and objects of the Constitution and in particular the provisions of section 9 of the Constitution.
What is not clear here is whether in fact the court may refuse all relief even if the claim otherwise is valid. It is suggested that the court is not so empowered and what is detailed is the discretion the court has in determining, firstly, whether in fact the rights concerned should be restored . If the court finds that such rights should not be restored, then the court has to determine the loss of the rights in money. It cannot sweep a claim under the carpet in the exercise of its discretion and deny relief merely on public interest considerations. In other words, if a dispossession is found to have been suffered as circumscribed, the claimant is entitled to relief, be it then in the form of monetary consideration. Of course , it leaves the door open for awarding very little monetary relief, but it does not (so it is submitted) entitle the court to ride rough-shot over the dispossession. See generally Pillay v Taylor-Burke Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others (LCC119/99) [1999] ZALCC 52 (19 October 1999) , para 49 & 111; In Re Kranspoort Community LCC 26/98(1); Tong op cit par 4.18.
III. The court has wide powers in making orders. It is not limited to the original land concerned and it can replace the original rights with others.
35.Court orders
(1) The Court may order -
(a) the restoration of land, a portion of land or any right in land in respect of which the claim or any other claim is made to the claimant or award any land, a portion of or a right in land to the claimant in full or in partial settlement of the claim and, where necessary, the prior acquisition or expropriation of the land, portion of land or right in land
...
(b) the State to grant the claimant an appropriate right in alternative state- owned land and, where necessary, order the State to designate it;
(c) the State to pay the claimant compensation;
(d) the State to include the claimant as a beneficiary of a State support programme for housing or the allocation and development of rural land;
(e) the grant to the claimant of any alternative relief.
(2) The Court may in addition to the orders contemplated in subsection (1) -
(a) determine conditions which must be fulfilled before a right in land can be restored or granted to a claimant;
(b) if a claimant is required to make any payment before the right in question is restored or granted, determine the amount to be paid and the manner of payment, including the time for payment;
(c) if the claimant is a community, determine the manner in which the rights are to be held or the compensation is to be paid or held;
(d) ..........
(e) give any other directive as to how its orders are to be carried out, including the setting of time limits for the implementation of its orders;
(f) make an order in respect of compensatory land granted at the time of the dispossession of the land in question;
(fA) make appropriate orders to give effect to any agreement between the parties regarding the finalisation of the claim
...
(3) An order contemplated in subsection (2)(c) shall be subject to such conditions as the Court considers necessary to ensure that all the members of the dispossessed community shall have access to the land or the compensation in question, on a basis which is fair and non-discriminatory towards any person, including a tenant, and which ensures the accountability of the person who holds the land or compensation on behalf of the community to the members of such community.
(4) The Court’s power to order the restitution of a right in land or to grant a right in alternative state-owned land shall include the power to adjust the nature of the right previously held by the claimant, and to determine the form of title under which the right may be held in future.
(5) ..........
IV. In the light of the above, does the court have the power to restore political rights to a dispossessed community? It was noted earlier that the franchise is bestowed by the Constitution on all - traditional authorities are an exception. The latter do not even need democratic structures to benefit under the Restitution Act - Baphiring Community v Uys & Others LCC 64/98(1); Tong op cit p71 par 2.
Can the court vary this? If the franchise was taken away irregularly (without full consideration of the facts), even by the Constitution, it seems to me that a court should have the power to correct that - be it then the Constitutional Court.
Awarding monetary compensation would seem rather inappropriate considering the drastic implications of a final removal of political power over the area concerned. It is difficult to see how such removal can be quantified in monetary terms. Of course one could end up with a solatium - but that is really scrapping the barrel.
An alternative to the restoration of political power on an international basis (ie regarding the regime to be established as on par with a state), could be the restoration of local government powers - similar to those enjoyed by tribal powers. These powers admittedly flow from the Constitution and legislation, but the argument is that an injustice is perpetrated by the Constitution which needs rectification. Perhaps the right of association (section 18 of the Constitution) can be used here.
It has to be recognized that the provision for self-determination (section 235) in the Constitution does not help here as it requires national legislation to empower any group. Little chance of that happening in a country where the majority is so firmly entrenched. In fact, the very existence of section 235 is a hurdle as it can be argued that groups can only be accommodated by means of additional legislation.
V. One may also derive some support from the situation in other countries. Tong (op cit p18) tells us:
Aboriginal rights in the Canadian context refer to aboriginal property rights, namely aboriginal title to land and resources as well as aboriginal political rights, which refer to aboriginal self-government as well as a variety of freedoms. Aboriginal rights are rights of the First Nations or aboriginal people based on their prior occupancy of the territory. Aboriginal title refers to aboriginal rights to land and natural resources. Jurisprudence from Canadian courts has defined it as a lesser form of ownership that constitutes a legal burden on Crown title since the aboriginal people have rights in land based on their prior occupancy.
Of course the FN claim does not entail rights based on the prior occupancy of the territory. It is submitted that this is not a fatal flaw as the issue of prior occupancy in SA is riddled with problems as the various aboriginal groups moved around and even displaced one another from time to time.What is important is that the purchase transaction constitutes a claim which by 1913 had matured into a legitimate right - displaced by 1994.
Some commentators may howl with derision at the idea that the *Dutch* constitute an aboriginal group. The term aboriginal (it is suggested) is hardly a technical over long periods of time in view of the movement of people and constitutes more an attempt to placate certain groups in unified statehood.
One may further note:
The 1982 Constitution Act of Canada states in section 25 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that equality rights contained in the Charter cannot be interpreted in a manner that diminishes aboriginal rights. Section 35 goes further to affirm existing aboriginal rights and treaty rights of the aboriginal people of Canada. Modern treaties in the Canadian context are those entered into by the Federal Government, provincial governments and the aboriginal people as a result of land claims based on aboriginal title.
(Tong ibid)
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Post by cjm on Jun 24, 2014 17:03:32 GMT
In the FN claim the claimants are described in the following terms:
In the Restitution Act a claimant is any person who lodges a claim (definition of claimant in section 1). Those who are entitled to restitution are generally either persons, their descendants, a deceased estate or a community or part of such community (section 2 and the definition section 1). A person is also defined as including a community or part of such community. It is not clear to me whether this takes the matter any further than section 2(1)(d) which provides expressly for community claims. Perhaps it is to make clear that even a descendant of the original community may claim. In Baphiring v Uys and others LCC 64/98 par 22 suggestions by counsel regarding the interpretation was considered and rejected without further guidance.
It seems to me that what is really intended in the FN documentation is a community claim as it is not alleged that the descendants concerned are in fact necessarily genetically related to those original inhabitants of the area concerned.
Various issues have been dealt with by the courts in the consideration of community claims. On these, see Tong op cit pp 45-46.
So it has been held that some members of the community could bring a claim even if the rest did not wish to do so.
A community which had been dispersed could continue to be regarded as a community if it continued to view itself as one unit and continues to uphold its cultural practices and traditions even under trying circumstances.
There has to be a community both at time of dispossession and the time of the claim.The members of the community need not be direct descendants of the original community. Even a family can qualify as a community.
So, it seems that the community as described in the FN claim may well be entitled to restitution as the present Afrikaner community is a spin-off of the original *Dutch* community and there has to be (as an additional qualifying feature) even descendants of that original community living in SA today.
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Post by cjm on Jun 28, 2014 22:01:10 GMT
Although any person can lodge a claim on behalf of a community, such person has to have the necessary authority to do so. See for example The Baphiring Community v Uys and others LLC 64/98 par 24; Section 10(1) of the Restitution Act. Disputes in this regard can to be dealt with by means of election by the community (Section 10(4) of the Restitution Act).
The authority mr Engelbrecht has to lodge this claim is of importance. It does not appear from the FN claim document.
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Post by cjm on Jun 30, 2014 14:32:45 GMT
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Post by cjm on Jul 1, 2014 6:15:26 GMT
Some very good responses to the previous post (at the link given):
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